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scionability requiring proof of procedural abuse with respect to the class
representatives and, as substantive unconscionability capable of presuming
procedural abuse with respect to the non-testifying class members.
Conclusion
The broad relief granted in Kugler depends primarily on the premise that the
doctrine of price unconscionability and the consumer class action device are
compatible. The court hurdled traditional difficulties inherent in class ac-
tions by establishing gross price disparity in all of the sales transactions as
the unconscionable common denominator. It acknowledged that an exor-
bitant price properly measured can be presumptive of procedural abuse in
the contract formation process. The class action provides a means whereby
numerous persons who are wronged by a common act are permitted to seek
redress in a single action, and, the employment of price unconscionability
in the consumer class action makes redress all the more possible. Admit-
tedly, Kugler may be narrowly construed, but to do so would pervert its
reasoning and totally disregard the controlling policy considerations it em-
braces as articulated in JTM:
No longer do we believe that fraud may be perpetrated by the
cry of caveat emptor. We have reached the point where 'Let the
buyer beware' is a poor business philosophy for a social order al-
legedly based upon man's respect for his fellow man. Let the
seller beware too! A free enterprise system not founded upon
personal morality will ultimately lose freedom.
08
William J. Brit
Municipal Tort Immunity: The Need
for Legislative Reform
The doctrine of municipal immunity from tort liability has been firmly
embedded in American jurisprudence since this country's inception. How-
ever, its erratic application and unclear foundation have together compelled
the legal community today to question the wisdom of its continued exist-
68. 275 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
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ence. Some of the factors that must be considered in such an analysis are
the topics of this note. First, we will examine the history and development
of the immunity rule in the United States as it bears on the questions of
both the degree of modification needed and the governmental institution
best suited to effect that change. Secondly, we will deal with the practical
and political considerations which necessarily merit close scrutiny by that
body charged with the duty of reforming the rule. Finally, we will assess
the judiciary's and the legislature's respective capabilities to deal with the
various issues which are indispensable to effectuate that long-awaited re-
form.
Early History
Sovereign immunity from tort liability was initially premised on the precept
that "the king can do no wrong,"' a myth that reached its apex under the
absolute monarchy of sixteenth century England.2 This doctrine apparently
had very little impact on the development of sovereign immunity in this
country, however, since no reference is made to it in any of the early tort
cases. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the maxim that a
sovereign can do no wrong has no place in American jurisprudence since
it is totally alien to the doctrine expressed in American federal and state
laws and constitutions, i.e. that public officials shall be held accountable for
their actions. 3 Rather, governmental immunity was transferred to the mod-
ern nation state for two reasons. First, to subject a sovereign state to suit
was the very antithesis of sovereignty, 4 and secondly, there can be no legal
right against the sovereign authority which itself makes the laws upon which
that right depends.5 As far as the incorporation of this doctrine into Ameri-
can law6 is concerned, the reasons supporting that incorporation are, at
best, unclear. The Supreme Court in 1793, 7 when it considered this very
question, found no federal constitutional basis for the doctrine as applied to
the states. This constitutional gap was subsequently filled by the passage of
the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution," which immunizes the state
from suit.
There are three prinicpal theories explaining the application of the im-
munity doctrine to municipalities and other local units of government, and
1. See 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATiSE § 25.01, at 436 (1958); Bor-
chard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1925).
2. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 996-97 (3d ed. 1964).
3. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879).
4. PRossER, supra note 2, at 997.
5. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
6. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
7. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 452, 458, 478 (1793).
8. Adopted in 1798.
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depending on which explanation is adhered to, a state court may or may not
have the power to modify or abrogate the doctrine. First, although not in
unanimous agreement, many American state courts9 trace the origin of the
local immunity doctrine to the 1788 English case of Russell v. Men of
Devon.10 In that case, Russell sued all the male inhabitants of the unin-
corporated County of Devon for damages to his wagon as a result of a
bridge being out of repair. It was undisputed that the county had the duty
to maintain such structures. The court held that plaintiff's action would
not lie because to permit it would lead to an "infinity of actions,"" be-
cause there was no fund to satisfy the claim, and lastly because only the
legislature should impose a liability of this kind. The court also stated that
although there is an equitable principle which permits a remedy for every
injury resulting from the neglect of another, a more applicable principle is
"that it is better that an individual should sustain an injury, than that the
public should suffer an inconvenience."'1 2 It has been claimed that the
Russell decision resulted primarily from the practical difficulty in awarding
damages.Y' However, while this may have been a factor, there is no evi-
dence to support a finding that, in the absence of a statute authorizing dam-
ages, liability would have been imposed even if the county had been incor-
porated and had funds to satisfy a judgment. The county's unincorporated
status may have had little effect upon the decision. In its decision to abro-
gate local immunity, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared
all local units of government liable regardless of whether they were incor-
porated,' 4 and as a general principle, in the United States today, authority
to institute suit against a governmental unit does not depend on that unit's
corporate status. Consequently, it appears much more likely that the Rus-
sell court based its holding, not on the corporate character of the county, but
rather on the belief that the legislature and not the court was charged with
the responsibility of deciding whether to impose liability of this nature.' 5
This view has been supported by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 16  In its
9. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
10. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
11. Id. at 362.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 389, 381 P.2d 107,
110 (1963); Muskoph v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 215, 359 P.2d 457,
459 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 282,
118 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1962).
14. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
15. For a contrary view on the influence of the unincorporated status of the County
of Devon on the Russell holding not to impose liability, see Assault on the Citadel:
De-Immunizing Municipal Corporations, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 832, 832-35 (1969-70).




decision on the local immunity question, while discussing the historical basis
for the doctrine of municipal immunity, the court reviewed the reasons given
by the Russell court and concluded by stating that "the court's [the Russell
court] invitation to the legislature has a familiar ring.' 1 7  For this reason
today's state courts which adopt the view that the Russell case is the origin
of the doctrine of local governmental immunity are therefore faced with the
Russell warning that this question is more properly a legislative concern.
A second view regarding the origin of the doctrine of municipal immunity
is that the doctrine merely became a settled principle of common law with
the Russell case, but had its origin more than two centuries earlier. It is
submitted that this interpretation is supported by a close reading of the
Russell opinion itself. In Lord Kenyon's majority opinion, for example,
reference is made to a case cited in Brooke's Abridgement as precedent for
the decision to disallow the suit.' 8 And Judge Ashurst, in his concurring
opinion, states: "Thus this case stands on principle: but I think the case
cited from Brooke's Abridgement is direct authority to show that no such
action could be maintained."' 9 This case, cited by both judges as authority
for their decision, is an ancient one. The case is reported in Brooke's
Abridgement, and Brooke died in 1588. With this reading of the Russell
case, it is arguable that local immunity was a common law concept long be-
fore 1799 (the date of Russell), and that the Russell case was merely a for-
mal embodiment of that rule.
This interpretation of the origin of municipal immunity raises an issue of
critical importance for state courts which are now contemplating either mod-
ification or abrogation of the rule, since in several states there are either
constitutional or statutory provisions which provide that the "common law"
shall remain in force until repealed by the legislature.2 0  The common law
referred to in these provisions is generally considered to be that body of
law in force in England prior to the American Declaration of Independence
in 1776.21 Consequently, if it is determined that the rule of municipal im-
17. id. at 282, 118 N.W.2d at 797.
18. Lord Kenyon concluded his opinion with the statement: "[Alnd there is a
precedent against it in Brooke." Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. at 673, 100 Eng.
Rep. at 362.
19. Id. at 673, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362-63.
20. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 2.01 (Supp. 1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 28, § 1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); Ky. CoNsT. § 233; MINN. CONST. sched., § 2; Wis. CONST.
art. 14, § 13.
21. See note 9 supra; Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953); Loudon
v. Loudon, 114 N.J. Eq. 242, 168 A. 840 (1933); Cawker v. Dreutzer, 197 Wis. 98,
221 N.W. 401 (1928).
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munity was in existence prior to the Russell case (and hence before the
American Declaration of Independence), and that a state does have a con-
stitutional or statutory provision empowering only the legislature to change
that law, then that state court is without jurisdiction to modify or abrogate
the common law rule of municipal immunity.
22
The third and last view regarding the origin of the doctrine of local gov-
ernmental immunity is that such immunity is derived from the state's tradi-
tional sovereign immunity from tort liability. Local units of government, in
the absence of state constitutional provisions to the contrary, derive not only
their corporate existence but also their powers to govern from the legisla-
ture. 23  Thus, these creations of the sovereign necessarily share in the state's
sovereignty. 24  When the New York State Legislature passed legislation
waiving that state's immunity from tort liability, 23 the New York Court of
Appeals subsequently ruled that by waiving the state's immunity the legis-
lature had also waived the immunity of local governmental units. 26 The
Court specifically stated that "none of the civil divisions of the State-its
counties, cities, towns, and villages-has any independent sovereignty ...
The legal irresponsibility heretofore enjoyed by these governmental units
was nothing more than an extension of the exemption from liability which
22. Two courts which have adopted this view of the origin of local immunity and,
as a result, have held that this interpretation precludes any action on their part in modi-
fying or abrogating the immunity rule, are the Wyoming Supreme Court (Maffei v.
Incorp. Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959) ), and the Tennessee
Supreme Court (Coffman v. City of Pulaski, 220 Tenn. 642, 422 S.W.2d 429 (1968) ).
See also the dissenting opinion in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit School Dist.,
No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 29, 163 N.E.2d 89, 98 (1959), recognizing the existence of
the Illinois statutory "common law" provision, and urging that on that basis the
court should not abrogate.
Many states have adopted the common law by statute or constitutions and many
have authorized the legislatures, not the courts, to alter it. However, even though a
state statute or constitution states that the English common law has been adopted, it
is significant that the courts interpret the content and meaning of the common law,
and this could nullify this potential obstacle to court action on the immunity question.
See, e.g., supra note 9.
Other courts have circumvented these statutory and constitutional provisions on the
theory that the nature of the common law has always been and must remain a
"dynamic" body of law. This theory renders those statutes allowing only the legisla-
ture to alter common law meaningless. See, e.g., Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400,
406, 37 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1949); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 11, 114 N.W.2d
105, 110 (1962).
23. 1 DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237
(5th ed. 1911); City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River R.R., 24 Iowa
455 (1868).
24. As pointed out earlier, the state has historically been held immune from suit
due to its sovereign nature.
25. N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, § 23; LAWS OF NEW YoRK ch. 467, § 1 (1929).
26. Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604, 605 (1945).
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the state possessed. '27 The Supreme Court of the State of Washington fol-
lowed this same rationale in a more recent case in which it held that the
legislature's waiver of the state's immunity also waived the immunity of the
local units of government.2 8 The court noted that its holding was based on
earlier decisions 29 which held that municipal corporations enjoy their im-
munity only insofar as they partake of the state's immunity. "They have
no sovereignty of their own, they are in no sense sovereign per se."
'30
This view of the origin of local immunity raises three very important
questions for those state courts presently considering the modification or
abrogation of the immunity rule. First, it is significant that the Washington
and New York courts referred to above abrogated the immunity rule only
after their respective legislatures had taken the initial steps with regard to
state immunity, thereby demonstrating two clear instances where state courts
have deferred to the legislature the determination as to the propriety of ex-
istence or non-existence of governmental immunity. Secondly, it can be ar-
gued that these courts did not in fact "abrogate" the rule of local immunity,
but rather "interpreted" the applicable state statute, in conjunction with the
common law rule, and in so doing determined that the full meaning of those
statutes applied also to local units of government. Third, if a court adheres
to the view that municipal immunity derives from state sovereignty, it is in-
consistent for that court to abolish the immunity rule as to the local units,
while at the same time holding the state immune. Therefore, unless a court
is willing to decide the question of the state's immunity, it should be pre-
cluded from modifying or abrogating the doctrine as it applies to local gov-
ernmental units.
Each of these three views of the origin of the doctrine of local govern-
mental immunity imposes some degree of restriction on the courts, and
elicits a warning to the court considering the immunity question. The com-
mon element appearing throughout each of these views is that it is primarily
a legislative prerogative to revise, abrogate or retain governmental immunity,
and consequently, the judiciary should defer to the legislature the ultimate
determination of this issue.
Incorporation and Development in America
It is generally agreed that the first American case holding in favor of the
immunity of local governmental units from suit was Mower v. Inhabitants of
27. Id.
28. Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 913, 916, 390 P.2d 2, 5 (1964).
29. Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 123 P. 450 (1912).
30. Id. at 334, 123 P. at 452.
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Leicester." Mower claimed that his horse was killed when it fell into a
hole on the Leicester Bridge as a consequence of the defendant's failure to
keep the bridge in good repair. Mower's attorney attempted to distinguish
the Russell case on grounds that Leicester was an incorporated town and
had a treasury out of which a judgment could be satisfied, while in Russell,
the County of Devon was unincorporated and therefore had no such funds.
The court nevertheless decided, on authority of Russell, that this "quasi-
corporation" was not liable at common law, thereby engrafting upon Ameri-
can law the doctrine of local governmental immunity.
8 2
Municipalities, however, were not able to convince the courts that they
should have the benefit of immunity from tort liability in all cases. In 1842,
the New York case of Bailey v. Mayor of New York33 first enunciated the
now familiar "governmental-proprietary" distinction as a criteria or standard
to be used to determine when liability would attach to municipalities. The
rationale giving rise to this standard is that in a variety of situations local
units of government act as involuntary agents of the state, executing state
public policies and thereby performing essentially state functions. In this
capacity, a municipality is strictly an arm of the state, stretching into locali-
ties and performing state imposed duties, and, as such, partakes of the state's
sovereign immunity from liability for any tortious conduct arising out of the
performance of these functions. The functions that local units perform in
this capacity are thus deemed "governmental" functions to which immunity
attaches.34  Eventually, however, municipalities undertook the performance
of "proprietary" or businesslike functions, whereby the municipality itself
(as opposed to the state) received either a benefit or a financial profit, or
both. In this capacity, the local unit of government is placed on the same
footing as a private corporation and, consequently, is not immune from
suit. Municipalities were said to have stepped outside their governmental
limits and entered the zone of private business or into activities which may
be, or frequently are, carried on by private enterprise.3 5 These activities
31. 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
32. Many commentators have stated that the Mower decision was clearly errone-
ous because there was a Massachusetts statute allowing for damages for this type of
injury. MASS. STAT. ch. 81, § 1 (1786). Furthermore, the Massachusetts court, in a
similar case eight years earlier, awarded- damages on the basis of this same statute.
Lobdell v. Inhabitants of New Bedford, 1 Mass. 153 (1804).
33. 3 Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N.Y. 1842).
34. Hayes v. Town of Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E.2d 726 (1944). One
of the best definitions of the law on this point appears in Note, Carrington v. St. Louis,
23 CENT. L.J. 494 (1886). Although this was a very early comment, it accurately de-
scribes the law on the governmental-proprietary distinction.
35. City of Hazard v. Duff, 287 Ky. 427, 154 S.W.2d 28 (1941); Bailey v. Mayor
of New York, 3 Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N.Y. 1842).
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have been deemed "proprietary," to which liability attaches as it does to
any private person or corporation.
Before the "governmental-proprietary" standard gained widespread ap-
proval, some courts attempted a different explanation or definition of the
functions which a municipalty performs, to use as a standard to determine
liability. Basically, a city was suable if the tort was committed while an
employee was discharging a "ministerial" duty, but it was immune from
suit if the act was committed while exercising a "discretionary" right.
3 6
Courts defined a "discretionary" function as a city's power to decide whether
or not to embark on a particular course of action. Thus, "discretionary"
contemplated policy-making, while "ministerial" contemplated the execution
of those policies.37 This explanation of a city's activities proved too confus-
ing in its application, and was therefore discarded at a very early stage in
the development of municipal immunity.38
With the early rejection of the "discretionary-ministerial" standard, most
states utilized the "governmental-proprietary" distinction to determine the
liability of the city. However, this too has produced many unjust and incon-
sistent results, leaving this area of the law in a highly confused condition.
The confusion is at its most obvious when certain municipal activities are
classified by courts as "governmental" in one case, and these same activities
deemed "proprietary" by another court in a similar case.39 However, the
inconsistencies resulting from the use of this distinction are not at all a result
of the artificiality of the test itself, but rather the result, perhaps the in-
evitable result, of the case-by-case application by the courts of a loosely de-
fined rule of law. The concept itself not only properly recognizes the dual
nature of the municipal corporation, but can indeed serve as an effective
tool in characterizing a specific city function for the purpose of determining
whether immunity will attach in light of that dual nature. As one commen-
tator 40 has pointed out, the fact that different courts in different jurisdictions
36. See Jones v. City of New Haven, 34 Conn. 1, 14 (1867), for an excellent ex-
planation of this concept.
37. See Hitchins Bros. v. Mayor of Frostburg, 68 Md. 100, 11 A. 826 (1887), for
an application of this test.
38. This standard did not remain dead for long. Today, it is the basic operating
principle of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80, and was also revived
in the District of Columbia in two recent decisions, Elgin v. District of Columbia,
119 U.S. App. D.C. 116, 337 F.2d 152 (1964), and Thomas v. Johnson, 295 F. Supp.
1025 (D.D.C. 1968).
39. For example, maintaining a public park has been held to be both a "govern-
mental" and a "proprietary" function, Claitor v. City of Commanche, 271 S.W.2d 465
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (proprietary); Vanderford v. City of Houston, 286 S.W. 568
(Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (governmental).
40. David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to immunity from
Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1959).
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have disagreed as to which functions are proprietary and which are govern-
mental, has no impact on the distinction's validity since the scope of a munic-
ipality's proprietary liability necessarily varies from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion as the authority of the governmental unit to embark on enterprises
varies. The fact that these local units derive their authority to engage in
specific activities from their respective state legislatures clearly implies that
functions performed by one unit may be governmental while the same func-
tion might be deemed proprietary in another state.
Consequently, the unjust and inconsistent results that the use of this test
have produced over the years are not due to any inherent failings of the
test, but rather to the lack of more precise and definite criteria on which to
base the classification. The issue raised is that, if we want to retain munici-
pal immunity insofar as a city's purely governmental functions are con-
cerned, which even the strongest critic of the immunity doctrine advocates, 41
then a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the many functions a city
performs is sorely needed in order to remove the uncertainty and inequities
of the case-by-case application of this standard. The attempts at such analy-
sis began in 1939 and continue to this day.
1939 to the Present
Beginning in the 1920's with the exhaustive critique by Professor Borchard,
it became increasingly apparent that the entire doctrine of municipal im-
munity, including the reasons supporting its existence and the standards
used to determine its application, needed serious re-thinking and modifica-
tion. The first step in this direction was taken in 1939 by the New York
Legislature with the Court of Claims Act, which waived the state's immunity
from both suit and liability. The act was later extended to cover local politi-
cal subdivisions of the state.42 Congress then continued the momentum
with the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946,4 3 and it appeared
that the long-awaited reform of governmental immunity was well on its way.
41. Professor Borchard, the leading advocate of governmental responsibility, in
recognizing the limits of liability, has stated:
There are certain public services which only the government can adequately
perform, as for example, the administration of justice, the preservation of pub-
lic peace and enforcement of the laws, and the protection of the community
from fire and disease. It may hence be conceded that the principle of im-
munity for the torts of officers engaged in 'governmental' functions, had
some legitimate field of application.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YAL L.J. 229, 240 (1925).
42. Holmes v. County of Erie, 266 App. Div. 220, 223, 42 N.Y.S.2d 243, 246
(1943), af'd, 291 N.Y. 798, 799, 53 N.E.2d 369 (1944); note 26 supra.
43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1970).
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However, other state legislatures balked and failed to respond to the New
York and Congressional initiatives. The resulting vacuum created by this
legislative inaction was soon filled by the courts in a series of decisions which,
if anything, created more problems than they purported to solve, and demon-
strated the futility of attempting to deal with a policy issue of this magnitude
within the confines of a courtroom. Indeed, in as many as seven instances
where immunity was judicially abolished or modified, the situation has been
satisfactorily resolved only by subsequent legislation. 44 In two jurisdictions
where the judiciary acted in the form of total abrogation, 45 a subsequent
retreat on the part of these same courts46 was an unequivocal admission that
the immunity question defied categorical solution. Noteworthy in this con-
nection is the fact that in California 4" and Minnesota 48 judicial mandates to
abrogate were delayed in order to allow the legislatures to construct the
appropriate machinery needed to deal with the inevitable problems that
would certainly attend any change in the immunity rule. In other states
where judicial abrogation has occurred, typical examples of the uncertainties
which arose include questions as to whether liability was being imposed
retrospectively or prospectively, whether abrogation applied to civil disasters
and other emergencies, and a host of other practical concerns relating to
limits of liability, financing the payment of judgments, administrative pro-
cedures to deal with the newly allowed claims, etc. Yet, in spite of this
increased confusion, or rather because of it, there is strong agreement today
that in order to meet the needs of both society as a whole and the in-
dividual who is injured by the government's tort, comprehensive modification,
not total abrogration, is where the answer lies. The words of Professor Van
Alstyne are particularly appropriate here:
It is all too easy for the uninformed observer to formulate an un-
discriminating judgment on these issues-to propose that public
entities be exposed to tort liability to the same extent as their pri-
vate counterparts, or at the opposite extreme, to propose a com-
plete restoration of governmental immunity. Intelligently con-
44. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901-02 (Supp. 1969); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-
996.6 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 85, §§ 1-101, 10-101 (Smith-Hurd 1966);
MicH. ComP. LAws ANrN. § 691.1401-.1415 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.01-.17
(1963); NEv. REv. STAT. Title 3, cl. 41 §§ 41.031-.039 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.43 (1966).
45. Colorado: Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279,
284-85, 316 P.2d 582, 585-86 (1957). Indiana: Klepinger v. Bd. of Comm'rs,
239 N.E.2d 160, 173 (Ind. App. 1968).
46. Colorado: City and County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 7, 9, 351 P.2d
826, 829, 830-31 (1960). Indiana: Perkins v. State, 251 N.E.2d 30, 35 (Ind. 1969).
47. CALIF. STAT. 1961, ch. 1404.
48. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d
795 (1962).
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ceived and pragmatically workable solutions, however, will emerge
only by diligent and unremitting intellectual effort in the difficult
policy-permeated areas which lie intermediate between such ex-
tremes.
49
Three Approaches to Modification
The basic problem is to determine how far it is desirable and so-
cially expedient to permit the loss distributing function of tort law
to apply to governmental agencies, without thereby unduly inter-
fering with the effective functioning of such agencies for their own
socially approved ends.50
The statement above aptly describes the need to strike a delicate balance
between two potentially conflicting interests: the desire to compensate tort
victims and the desire to allow local governments to perform vital services
without fear of calamitous financial disruptions. Such a balancing test must
of necessity be applied by anyone undertaking a modification of the doctrine
of governmental immunity. Any modification of the doctrine can take one
of three alternative forms.
First, the doctrine could be reinvigorated to its Middle Ages' level of
strength, i.e., all suits against the government by a private citizen claiming
damages for tortious injury would be barred. Such an application is likely
to benefit no one, for, while working an unreasonable hardship upon the
injured parties, 51 it would at the same time encourage a lack of care on the
part of public entities.
5 2
The second alternative is at the opposite extreme, and would consist of a
waiver of any and all immunity. This course of action would obviously
benefit the individual tort victim. But, apart from the serious financial bur-
den which would have to be borne by a municipality under such a plan,
there are other likely effects which could be harmful to the community
served by that government. One such result would be a reluctance on the
part of municipal officials to act when there would be a concomitant risk of
liability. 8 Secondly, there is the potential impairment of the efficient func-
49. Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463, 532 (1963).
50. id. at 469.
51. ". . . [Tihe denial of recourse against the state to an individual who is injured
or whose property is damaged by the officers, agents or employees of the state en-
gaged in their official duties is . . . a glaring exception to the maxim that there must
be a remedy for every wrong." Note, Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability:
Has the Rationale Disappeared?, 39 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 252, 255 (1970-71).
52. "There can be little doubt that immunity fosters neglect and breeds irre-
sponsibility, while liability promotes care and caution." Rabon v. Rowan Memorial
Hosp. Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 13, 152 S.E.2d 485, 493 (1967).
53. For an argument that the "blanket waiver" will have the opposite effect, see
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tioning of local governments, in light of their inability to undertake long-
range fiscal planning without fear of interference from large tort judgments.
54
What the California Law Revision Commission called the "blanket waiver
approach"5 5 attempts to equate governmental units with private persons for
purposes of applying tort law concepts. That Commission in its Sovereign
Immunity Study (hereinafter the California Study) listed some of the "strik-
ing differences between private entities and public entities." 56  The differ-
ence between the types of activities is clear, but it is important to remember
that the difference exists primarily because many functions of municipal
governments are avoided by private parties because the performance of
such functions carries inherent risks, e.g., administration of prisons and men-
tal hospitals, law enforcement, fire prevention and control.
57
Activities of governmental units have a much more profound effect on
our lives than the activities of private entities. The government makes laws,
establishes courts, levies taxes, and regulates through licensing and zoning.
What activity of a private entity could compare with those listed above? 58
"Yet, it must be remembered that public entities charged with such duties
and responsibilities cannot simply avoid the risk by refusing to act. .. .
Not only must public entities, such as municipalities, perform certain func-
tions, but in many cases they cannot even afford to hesitate to act.60
Thus, the "blanket waiver approach" would leave municipalities charged
with the unavoidable duty to engage in inherently dangerous activities which
must be performed for the good of the general public, and which cannot,
or will not, be performed by any other, but which activity forces the munic-
ipality to risk tort liability unshielded by any special consideration or im-
Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign Without Immunity, 36 S. CAL.
L. REV. 161, 178 (1963).
54. "Efficient and foresighted planning of governmental activities and their fiscal
ramifications becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, when the threat of pos-
sibly immense but unascertainable tort obligations hangs like a dark cloud on the
horizon." Van Alstyne, supra note 49, at 467.
55. 5 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP., RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 269
(1963).
56. The major differences listed are the public entities' police powers and taxing
powers. Id.
57. "Many of the activities carried on by government are of a nature so inher-
ently dangerous that no private industry would wish to undertake the risk of admin-
istering them." Kennedy and Lynch, supra note 53, at 177.
58. "Both in scope and variety, public activities range far beyond those of private
enterprise." Comment, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Im-
munity, 1964 DUKE L.J. 888, 893 (1964). It has been argued that many private in-
dustries have risks as great as those in government activities. Ely, Tort Liability of
State Agents and Independent Contractors, 35 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 119, 122 (1966-67).
59. Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. OF
ILL. L. FORUM 919, 923 (1966).
60. Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 53, at 178.
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munity. The resulting possibility of a proliferation of private litigation
against municipalities is real. Though some commentators feel that a fear
of nuisance suits is unfounded, 6I it requires no statistical survey to realize
that a municipality could quite possibly be deluged with damage suits in
the absence of immunity. The vast and expanding range of local govern-
ment activity makes municipalities peculiarly susceptible to incurring tort
liability,6 2 and, (putting aside consideration of the cost of satisfying ad-
verse judgments63 ) the cost of fighting a great number of damage suits is
considerable on its own.
In light of what has been discussed above, the third alternative, the "selec-
tive approach," 4 appears to be the best solution. The discussion of the
"blanket waiver approach" pointed up some of the difficulties attendant to
a complete removal of immunity. However, the "selective approach" re-
quired consideration of all of those difficulties, plus a great many more. It
must also be decided whether the legislature or the judiciary is best suited
to modify by this approach. In this regard, we will discuss the considerations
relevant to devising a comprehensive scheme and the respective capabilities
of the judiciary and the legislature. It seems the "selective approach" can
be most effectively taken by the latter, as will be shown below.
Relevant Considerations
Most states have passed a statute waiving immunity in certain cases.65
Within any one state the waiver provisions are likely to cover a wide range
of activities, and as applied to local governments there may be substantial
variations. In addition, there is likely to be case law in a state which in
some way abrogates the immunity doctrine.0 6 All of these extant modifica-
tions should be considered in developing a plan for immunity.0 7 By em-
61. Supra note 51, at 255; Majure, Minick & Snodgrass, The Governmental Im-
munity Doctrine in Texas-An Analysis and Some Proposed Changes, 23 Sw. L.J.
341, 346 (1969).
62. For a sample of the range of activities, see Kennedy and Lynch, supra note 53,
at 170.
63. "It is well known that a very substantial proportion of the cost of litigation
goes for attorney's fees and court costs rather than for the payment of judgments .. "
Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 53, at 182. Judge Greenhill said that in 1969 the City
of Houston employed approximately forty attorneys, but if immunity were abolished
that city would be required to hire an additional forty. Greenhill, Should Govern-
mental Immunity for Torts Be Re-Examined, And, If So, By Whom?, 31 TEx. BAR.
J. 1036, 1068 (1969).
64. Supra note 55, at 271.
65. Some examples can be found in Van Alstyne's article, Governmental Tort Lia-
bility: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REv. 163 (1963).
66. Supra note 55, at 219-236.
67. Id. at 282.
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ploying established principles, as much as possible, the new scheme will be
more readily accepted and the transition will be smoother. A legislature
can bring before it for consideration all existing law on the subject of im-
munity and use it as a starting point.A8 Rather than acting as a sturdy
foundation upon which to build, existing law will act as a hurdle to a court
attempting modification. The doctrine of stare decisis tends to restrict the
courts' departures from prior case law, 69 while a necessary respect for legis-
lative enactments makes courts reluctant to ignore statutory law.
The California Study provides an excellent outline of what the relevant
considerations are in modifying the doctrine of governmental immunity.70
The character and number of these considerations aptly point up the need
for legislative rather than judicial modification.
The liability of a municipality should vary proportionately to the degree
of fault on the part of the government. One would not be as offended by a
statute protecting a public entity from liability for actions taken in good
faith as one might be by a statute protecting it from negligent action re-
sulting in harm to an individual. Since in many cases a public entity can-
not refuse to perform a dangerous function, a modification of the immunity
doctrine should be designed to protect actions taken in good faith.
The same consideration should be given to the degree of risk taken by a
municipality in carrying out necessary functions. Law enforcement is the
perfect example of a high risk activity. While it is vitally necessary to a
community, it cannot be treated on a par with activities such as highway
maintenance or housing regulation. In 1963, the Sheriff's Department of
Los Angeles County made 74,132 arrests; 71 consider how many arrests
must be made every year by New York City, Chicago and San Francisco
police departments and the awesome range of this one governmental activity
is clear. The risk involved is also clear, and so should be the need for pro-
tecting cities and counties from liability in this area.
The deterrent effect of the imposition of liability must also be considered
an important inducement to abolish immunity. However, rendering the mu-
nicipality liable takes the burden from city employees, with the result that
we have a municipality deterred, with employees given no reason for cau-
tion. On the other hand, the result might be excessive caution in the per-
formance of duties, a not altogether desirable end. 72
68. Id. at 516-19.
69. Supra note 1, § 25.01, at 96 (Supp. 1965).
70. Those considerations include: degree of fault, degree of risk, deterrent effect,
and means for assuring satisfaction of judgments. Supra note 55.
71. Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 53, at 170.
72. Id. at 178.
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After having considered factors such as degree of fault, degree of risk,
and deterrent effect, the framer of a comprehensive scheme must then es-
tablish standards of care. Judge David, writing in 1959, prior to Califor-
nia's radical revision of the immunity doctrine, emphasized the great diffi-
culties which would be encountered in setting up standards of care. 73  He
cited numerous examples of the failures of the judiciary in applying a stand-
ard of care to municipal activities.74  A municipality generally controls more
property, more vehicles, and more employees than most of its private citi-
zens. Its duties of inspection, care, etc. must necessarily differ from the
same duties imposed on the head of a two-car family.
Assessing the standards for liability and the limits of immunity is only
a part, albeit a significant one, of the task facing anyone undertaking a
comprehensive modification of the doctrine of governmental immunity.
While that aspect of the relevant considerations could arguably be adequate-
ly handled by a court, the standards and rules prescribed would likely be
of limited application. The second aspect of a comprehensive scheme must
provide for financial coverage of any claims allowed; it is this problem,
above all, that demonstrates the exclusive competence of the legislature in
dealing with the immunity doctrine.
Not all governmental units are equipped, financially, to satisfy adverse
tort judgments. As the California Study makes clear, there are a number
of public entities with extremely small revenues, 75 and in some cases a sub-
stantial tort judgment could deal a crushing blow to these municipalities.
Local government revenues are generally dependent upon the size of popu-
lation. Throughout the country there is a significant disparity of size among
units of local government. 76  A municipality's liability must be controlled
so that it will not be faced with claims it cannot possibly pay. In California
"[t]he total annual revenues of some public agencies are less than the
monthly earnings of many private individuals of modest means."177 If lia-
bility is not limited to specific dollar amounts, a plan must be devised to as-
73. David, supra note 40, at 16. "The City of Los Angeles has roughly 6,000
miles of public street. Laid end to end, the streets would stretch from San Francisco
to New York and back, with a third traverse reaching Salt Lake City. Laid end to
end, Los Angeles city sidewalks would reach from San Francisco to Tokyo and back;
or from San Francisco to Cape Town, South Africa. What is the feasible duty of
inspection?"
74. Id. at 17.
75. Supra note 55, at 289.
76. In 1967 there were 38,202 counties, municipalities, and townships in the
United States, and while 255 of these had populations of 250,000 or more, the vast
majority (31,009), had populations of less than 5,000. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1970, at 404 (91st ed. 1970).
77. Supra note 55, at 289.
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sure that claims will be paid. It is a hollow victory to win a judgment
against a city which cannot pay.
The problem of a municipality's curtailing necessary public functions in
the face of tort liability was dismissed by Mr. Ben Ely with this statement:
Very few private corporations have been prevented from entering
into a socially desirable field of activities because of the fear of
tort liability. The corporation either sets aside out of its earnings
a sufficient reserve to meet such contingencies or it insures
against them in some private insurance company.
78
Mr. Ely further states that municipalities can obtain liability insurance, and
at the same time are "in an even better position than the private entrepre-
neur to spread the loss through the medium of taxation.
'79
As to the concept of spreading loss through taxes, Mr. Ely seems to have
overlooked some very relevant data. The California Study is one of the
most exhaustive treatments of the pragmatic problems of modification, and
indicates that loss-spreading through taxes will not easily be accomplished
in every municipality, at least in California. 0 Any taxing authority of a
municipality is generally given by the state legislature and "Not only are
there extreme differences in total assessed valuations of taxable property
in various public entities, but the tax base itself is not uniform." 8' Not all
municipalities impose income or sales taxes;8 2 some do not even have prop-
erty tax power. In 1960 there were 81,248 local governments, 70,726 of
which had property taxing power and 10,522 of which had no such power.83
The object of tort liability is to spread the loss, but without legislative enact-
ments many municipalities cannot raise the money, and there is even some
question as to whether money raised by legislatively approved tax levies
can be used to satisfy judgments. This problem stems from the concept
that tax revenues are held by the government in trust for certain uses, and
that use of such revenue to satisfy tort claims would constitute a breach of
trust.8 4 A legislative enactment could most effectively eliminate this prob-
lem by specifically allowing municipalities to satisfy tort judgments with
funds derived from taxes.8 5
78. Ely, supra note 58, at 122-23.
79. Id. at 123.
80. "Finally, substantial variations in taxing power exist between public entities as
reflected in the differing tax limits imposed by statute. But, even assuming that no
tax limit was applicable . . . strong practical differences in taxing power would con-
tinue to be felt .. " Supra note 55, at 291.
81. Id. at 290.
82. Supra note 76, at 424.
83. Id. at 405.
84. O'Connell v. Merchants' and Police Dist. Telegraph Co., 167 Ky. 468, 470,
180 S.W. 845, 847 (1915).
85. Supra note 55, at 284-86.
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Mr. Ely's second assumption is that municipalities can obtain liability in-
surance, a questionable reason for abrogation at best. As one eminent jurist
has stated, "The necessity for insurance presents possibly the strongest argu-
ment for legislative rather than judicial abrogation of the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity."86
Even when the doctrine of governmental immunity was at its peak, many
municipalities were being held liable for certain tortious conduct, and many
were carrying insurance authorized by the legislature. It can readily be
seen how insurance premiums for municipalities would be lower when lia-
bility was the exception rather than the rule. Thus, a problem which a legis-
lature must face in modifying the immunity doctrine is whether its plan will
state specifically when the public entity is liable, leaving all other activities
immune, or whether it will leave the government liable at all times except
in those cases referred to in the statute. The former plan has been called
"closed end" liability, the latter "open end" liability. Mssrs. Kennedy and
Lynch have aptly described the effect of an "open end" plan on a govern-
ment's ability to obtain liability insurance:
However, it seems clear that if the "open end" approach to lia-
bility were used there would be a substantial problem in obtaining
any insurance since companies would not wish to risk coverage of
such a vague and indefinite area of liability except at a prohibitive
cost.87
The California Law Revision Commission recommended a "closed end" ap-
proach to allow more efficient fiscal planning. 8 The Commission's Study
also dealt with the insurance problem and found that "the obvious utility
of insurance as a device for mitigating the adverse impact of tort liability
warrants consideration of legislation to accomplish the following purposes:"
a. To expressly authorize all public entities to insure against the personal
liability of their agents for any tort they might commit. (Only a few
entities were so authorized at this time.)
b. To expressly authorize all public entities to insure against their own
liability for any torts.
c. To expressly authorize entities to insure by purchasing coverage from a
private company or by self-insurance.
d. To expressly authorize entities to pool their resources so as to purchase
coverage without incurring a serious financial burden.80
86. Greenhill, supra note 63, at 1069.
87. Kennedy and Lynch, supra note 53, at 179.
88. 4 CAL. LAw REVISION COMM'N REP., RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES, 803,
811 (1963).
89. Supra note 55, at 296, 297.
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Only a legislature could accomplish such purposes in most states. The
"closed end" approach, which is most desirable, would require a careful
examination of governmental activities so as to determine what activities
should carry the risk of liability, but the "open end" approach would not.9°
On this basis, it appears that the legislature is best suited for devising a plan
based on the "closed end" approach.
The problem of assuring that payment of authorized claims against a mu-
nicipality will be forthcoming makes the modification of the immunity doc-
trine a peculiarly legislative problem. Self-insurance is equivalent to a direct
payment, as if uninsured, and thus involves the problems of broadening the
tax base and authorizing the use of tax revenues to pay tort judgments.
The cost of purchasing insurance is likely to vary proportionately according
to the extent of express liability and vague immunity. Moreover, the money
to purchase insurance must come from a city's revenue, which, in many
cases, must be authorized by the legislature.
Conclusion
As the foregoing strongly suggests, the judiciary is simply not designed to re-
solve the immunity problem.91 Certainly, the courts can, and in a number
of cases did, act as a spur to legislative action, 92 but the comprehensive, de-
tailed scheme needed to settle the questions surrounding the immunity doc-
trine is not likely to be forthcoming from a single case or line of cases.9 3
A court faced with an immediate conflict between a private citizen's right to
recover for injuries and a municipality's need for protection is likely to be
influenced by the "David and Goliath" aspects of the contest, and the judi-
ciary relies for its decisions on facts submitted by the adversaries. 94  Not
only are these facts likely to be colored according to the particular adver-
sary's bias, but the court is dependent on this source of data since the judi-
ciary is not designed for independent information gathering. And yet, in-
dependent data gathering is what is most essential in devising a scheme of
liabilities and immunities. There must be a thorough, exhaustive assimila-
90. Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 53, at 179.
91. See Comment, Duke L.J., supra note 58, at 891; Note, Municipal Corporations-
Liability In Tort-Prospective Judicial Abrogation of the Sovereign Immunity Con-
cept, 60 MicH. L. REV. 379, 382 (1962).
92. See Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit School Dist., No. 302, 18 Il. 2d 11,
163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Muskoph v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457
(1961); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961). See also
Van Alstyne, supra note 59, at 930 et seq.
93. Accord, Van Alstyne, supra note 49, at 466.
94. "Limitations of this type are characteristic of the very process of judicial law-
making and are derived from the inherent nature of the adversary system of admin-
istering justice." Van Alstyne, supra note 65, at 163.
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